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process of law. The author further demands the salutary control
over executive law making and application that would be furnished
by judicial review under conditions that would not be too burdensome
and uncertain for the subject. It is in this connection that the author
contends for the development of a wholesome body of administrative
law in harmony with the traditional principles of the general legal
system, although he does not favor the establishment of a separate
system of tribunals for this purpose. This he conceives to be essential unless "we are prepared to admit that the whole constitutional
center of gravity has moved from the legislature to the executive;
unless we are willing to be governed not by ourselves through our
representatives but by officials who are responsible to no electorate;
unless, in short, we are disposed to revise the whole theory and practice of the constitution which has so long been our boast." It must be
admitted that the suggestions fit eminently into a theory that stresses
the importance of government by an elected parliament, and that conceives of the judiciary as a most important device for insuring government by law instead of by men.
The author has been concerned wholly with a situation that seems
to have been developing in the British government at an accelerated
pace during and since the war. It would be a mistake, however, to
view his discussion as having no value for ourselves. Some of the
evils against which his criticisms are directed are less likely to arise
among us because of the salutary restrictions on legislative, executive, and administrative action developed from our constitutional theories of the separation of powers and due process in its application
to procedure. Other of the evils adverted to are as likely to exist
among us as among the British. The dangers to the citizen's liberty
and other interests that arise in a highly developed bureaucracy have
been strikingly indicated by the author, and his discussion at least
contains a warning to us. That constitutes, in fact, the principal
value of the book for us. It should be noted that the author's style
is clear and precise. There are several appendices of which the first,
which strongly opposes the rendering by courts of what we would
call advisory opinions, will be found the most interesting and important.
University of Minnesota Law School. HENRY ROTTSCHIAEFER
STEPHEN

J.

By Carl Brent Swisher.
Published by The Brookings Institution, 1930.

FIELD-CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW.

Washington:
Pp. viii, 473.

Lovers of good biography, whether they be lawyers or laymen,
should find in this volume a valuable addition to our too scanty collection of biographies of great American judges., Students of the
judicial process as it is exemplified in the work of the Supreme Court
of the United States will find much in the volume which is suggestive
and valuable. To that considerable class of people who accept literally the dogma that "this is a government not of laws, but of men,"
a perusal of this book should be an educative, if disillusioning, experience.
Stephen J. Field was beyond doubt one of the most vital and
colorful personalities the accident of political appointment has brought
to the bench of our highest court. The great powers of his mind, the
strength of his convictions, and his stubborn and dominating will
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would under almost any conditions have assured him a place of influence and distinction on any court. He left a much deeper impress
upon the law of California than other able judges who sat for much
longer periods than he upon the Supreme Court of that state. Yet it
may be doubted that his great talents and his unusual personal qualities adequately explain his profound influence in molding the attitudes
and doctrines of the nation's high court, an influence equalled or
surpassed only by that of Chief Justice Marshall and perhaps Chief
Justice Taney.
The full explanation, Mr. Swisher recognizes, must rather be
found in the conditions in the midst of which Field pursued his dramatic and varied career, in the ideas motivating the society in which
he lived. He typified to an extraordinary degree the strength and
the weakness of his age. It was a period of deep economic and social
change. The natural resources of the country were being exploited
with unprecedented rapidity and ruthlessness. The nation was undergoing a transformation from an agricultural to an industrial economy.
Capital was accumulating at a rapid rate, chiefly under corporate
control. Financial power was becoming centralized in the hands of a
small fraction of the population. Labor's consciousness of its interests as a class and the necessity for organization for the effective
protection thereof was growing.
How inevitable it was that bitter conflicts of interest should
emerge from this welter of economic and social forces and that efforts
should have been made by means of legislation to resolve these conflicts and to modify the course and direction of this economic evolution. Under our constitutional system it became the duty of the court
of which Field was a member to define the limits within which such
legislative power might be exercised. The justices found awaiting
them the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, the
"convenient vagueness" of whose terms left them free to write their
social and economic philosophies into their definitions of these limits,
under the guise of interpretation of such phrases as "due process of
law, "equal protection of the laws," and "interstate commerce." Combining as Field did extraordinary powers of intellect and will, knowledge of the common law, and large capacity for work with a natural
rights philosophy which was in accord with the prevailing ideas of the
day, it is not surprising that he should have played so dominating a
part in shaping the contours of the law.
The doctrines of laissez faire found a fertile soil in this country
during the period of Field's judicial labors. The attitude of mind of
which these doctrines are at once product and cause finds a natural
rights philosophy with its doctrines of vested rights and privileges
a congenial one. Legislative regulation cannot be carried very far
without coming into collision with rights and privileges of free user
of property, clothed in the hallowed garb of vested interests, or without impairing the freedom of the individual to secure to himself by
contract and conduct all the advantages he is able, by virtue of superior talents or economic position, to win over his fellow men. Laissez
faire therefore appears as a logical corollary to the philosophy of
natural rights in which Field so passionately believed, since only
through voluntary or constitutionally enforced abstention from legislative interference with the free play of economic forces could adequate protection of these interests of property and individual liberty
be assured. It was not so much that the California justice and those
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of like belief consciously or deliberately preferred the individual to
the social interest, for they could scarcely conceive the possibility of
real conflict between them. The true and ultimate social interest in
their view lay in the maximum of protection of property acquisitions
and the freedom of the individual from legal restrants. It has often
been observed that Field's notable dissenting opinions, beginning with
the Slaughter-House case and running down through the Granger
cases, have supplied most of the ideational content for subsequent
opinions of the Supreme Court in cases striking down social legislation as violative of freedom of contract, the ideas and concepts which
Justice Holmes has for so many years valiantly resisted and sought to
destroy.
True it is, as Mr. Swisher points out, that Justice Field did not
always hold this point of view. On the contrary, he wrote opinions
during his earlier years on the Supreme Court of California which
were markedly liberal in tone. But as he grew older he became the
conservative natural rights judge par excellence. The biographer
has provided through his research much interesting material regarding Field's family, his childhood and young manhood in a pious New
England family environment, his education, his brief period of professional practice with his famous brother in New York, and his
subsequent colorful and dramatic years as a California lawyer and
judge. He has made an earnest, if not altogether successful, effort
to analyze and interpret his subject's personality and the motivations
of his conduct both on and off the bench in terms of these earlier environmental factors and experiences as well as in the light of political,
social, and intellectual pressures to which he was subjected during his
Washington years. Fortunately Mr. Swisher was not blinded by his
admiration for his subject to the fact that that subject was a very
human person. He therefore does not hesitate to recognize political
ambition and other selfish considerations as among the factors coloring his judicial attitudes and, indeed, perceptibly influencing certain of his decisions, such as in the later Chinese Exclusion cases. He
is not among those who regard as well-nigh treasonable the view that
men do not cease to be men, even when they occupy so exalted a
place as the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States. Indeed so objective is the biographer's attitude toward his evidence that
he is even able to forbear dogmatic denials of the charges of corruption levelled at Field while he was upon the state bench, merely observing that the charges cannot be said to be sustained by the available evidence. This objectivity is also apparent in the chapters dealing with the tragic quarrel with Terry, the Greenback cases, and the
Hayes-Tilden election controversy.
Despite its admirable qualities, it cannot safely be asserted that
the book will ultimately rank high as a study in judicial behaviorism.
That thousands will derive pleasure from its interesting and readable
portrayal of an extraordinary career there can be little doubt.
ARTHUR H. KENT.
Volumes I, II. By
Charles W. Pitkin. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931.
Pp. xxxiv, 794.
The major purpose of this work is to present the development
of social legislation and administration in England and France, with
SOCIAL POLITICS AND IIODERN DEMOCRACIES.

